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Response to Sander Greenland’s Critique
of Bounding Analysis
Elizabeth A. Casman,1∗ Minh Ha-Duong,1,2 and M. Granger Morgan1
1. RESPONSE TO THE CRITIQUE
1.1. Bounding Analysis is Not an Alternative
to Standard Risk Assessment
Greenland misses the point of our method. He
suggests that we have proposed “bounding analysis as
an alternative to probabilistic risk assessment, or even
as a standard to judge the latter.” This is not correct.
Our opening paragraphs and our previously published
qualitative arguments on this same subject(1) clearly
explain that we are only proposing this approach to
deal with situations in which the existing data are in-
sufficient to support standard methods of risk assess-
ment. The idea is to use the parts of the problem that
can be characterized using conventional probabilis-
tic risk analysis to back out an upper bound on the
contribution made by the causes for which there are
scanty data.
The application of conventional probabilistic
methods to such poorly understood causes can yield
broad probability distributions, which, when added
to the better defined estimates of cases due to the
well-known causes, yield an estimate of the sum that
includes many more cases than the number that is
known to have occurred. In such circumstances we
argue that it should be possible to bound the esti-
mate of the number of deaths from poorly understood
causes.
When adequate science is available to character-
ize all the exposures that contribute to a specific health
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endpoint, clearly one should adopt conventional risk
analysis. But in the case when some of the exposures
contributing to a risk are poorly understood it is sim-
ply not possible to follow Greenland’s prescription
of applying advanced methods such as meta-analysis,
or the “specification of a joint prior for all unknown
parameters.”
The reasoning based on order-of-magnitude
arguments and bounding methods is common in many
fields of science and engineering. The point of such
methods is not to produce a precise answer, but to get
the answer into the right ballpark. We believe that
there are some circumstances in which such methods
should also be applied in risk analysis.
1.2. A Bound is Not a Confidence Interval
Greenland complains that we have no opera-
tional definition of bounds or reliable means for mea-
suring them. Our definition of bounds is simply the
highest and lowest fraction of lung cancer mortal-
ity that the expert believes could be caused by each
factor, singly and in combination with other expo-
sures. Since these bounds cannot be directly measured
experimentally, we ask for the expert’s informed opin-
ions. This is the kind of situation for which expert elic-
itation is most appropriate.(2)
Greenland’s extended discussion of whether a
bound is 0.69, 0.70, or 0.71 reframes the question in
terms of confidence intervals. Our elicitation protocol
poses questions such as “What is the highest value that
you believe the total fraction of lung cancer mortality
due to this factor could be?” We seek an upper bound,
not a 90% or 98% confidence interval. Greenland
criticizes a number we used in our worked example
(a lower bound of 0.70 on the fraction of lung can-
cer mortality due to smoking) as being lower than
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literature values. But that is what the lower bound
is supposed to be: a number that we believe the real
fraction must exceed. It is neither the best estimate
nor a (1 − α) lower confidence limit. The numerical
example provided in the article was only intended to
illustrate the method. As might be expected, results
from the expert elicitations we are now conducting
are different from the values used in the example.
To assure that the elicited bounds meet our defini-
tion, at the end of our elicitation protocol we ask the
experts to systematically revisit all the bounds they
have set and consider reassessing some if they are
not similarly confident about all of them. We under-
stand that experts may be overconfident and we make
no claim that our method can produce estimates that
are highly precise. Our claim is that bounding argu-
ments can set a first-order limit on the upper bound
of the residual that can be used to gauge the plausi-
bility of estimates of the impacts of the poorly docu-
mented causes. In this context, an elaborate treatment
of second-order uncertainty strikes us as inappropri-
ate and probably not helpful.
1.3. Expert Elicitation is Not a Substitute
for Doing the Science
Greenland is disparaging of the use of expert sub-
jective judgment. We agree that expert judgment is
inferior to directly relevant high-quality scientific ev-
idence and analytical methods whenever the latter
are available. We also agree that expert judgment
is subject to a variety of biases produced by cogni-
tive heuristics. It is for that reason that more than a
decade ago one of us argued(2) that “the use of expert
subjective judgment is not a substitute for proper sci-
entific research. Expert judgment can be helpful in
policy analysis when decisions must be made before
all the necessary science is known. In most cases, how-
ever, having made initial decisions on the basis of
expert judgment, one should follow up with the ap-
propriate science, to assure that in the future, policy is
more firmly rooted in physical reality.” We continue to
hold this view. However, when directly relevant high-
quality scientific evidence is lacking, we believe that
expert judgment, carefully informed by whatever sci-
entific evidence and analytical models are available,
is often the best alternative.
In our article we indicated that we plan to illus-
trate the method of bounding by conducting a series
of expert elicitations. We have now begun to perform
these elicitations. In addition to presenting the experts
with summaries of the relevant literature, we encour-
age them to turn to all available evidence to inform
their judgments. We conduct the interviews in the
experts’ offices so that their reference materials are
readily available. During one recently completed elic-
itation, the expert, who was the director of a major re-
search group, paused on several occasions during the
process to phone colleagues to ask them to perform
supporting analysis, or to check data in the literature.
Could the results be biased? Of course. However, we
are not aware of a better feasible alternative.
Greenland implied that we are forcing a con-
sensus on the experts. Our method does not de-
mand or seek consensus among experts. The results
of individual elicitations are not combined, and will
be presented independently, as they have been in
previous elicitations we have conducted.(3–5) Indeed,
the range of the resulting bounds should provide
additional insight on our state of understanding or
ignorance.
1.4. Mathematical Development
One of the important lessons we have learned
about applied policy analysis is that methods pro-
posed in theory need to be refined through applica-
tion. As we have begun to apply our ideas to a real
problem we have discovered issues that required re-
finement or correction. For example, after running our
first elicitation we determined that it is not necessary
to disallow three-way and higher interaction terms,
or to impose the full set of 2|| + 2 coherence con-
straints (Equation (6)). Since we are only interested
in the upper bound on the residual, only the coher-
ence constraint pertaining to it (a) and consistency
(b) need be satisfied in order to determine the upper
bound on the residual.
f (X)+
∑
s j =X
f (s j ) = 1 s j ∈ , 1 ≤ j ≤ ||, (a)
∑
s j
f (s j ) ≤ 1 s j ∈ , 1 ≤ j ≤ || (b)
The method described in the article produced a full
set of coherent bounds (quantifying all the interac-
tion terms) implied by the expert’s original bounds—
which involved unnecessary detail. Our simplification
allows the direct calculation of the upper bound on
the residual without requiring an optimization pro-
gram maximizing unspecificity. We still stand by our
development of the mathematical theory, but now fo-
cus exclusively on the portion that defines the bounds
on the residual. Greenland asked where and how
Laplace’s Principle of Insufficient Reason was used
to calculate the bounds. Though our current solution
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method does not require this, we were referring to
the choice of objective function of the optimization,
which searched for the most unspecific set of bounds
compatible with the elicited bounds (Equation (5)).
2. CONCLUSION
We appreciate the considerable effort that Green-
land has made in developing his critique. We certainly
will follow his advice that we continue to refine and
improve the work. We hope that this exchange will
prompt others to explore alternative ways to apply
order-of-magnitude and bounding methods, so com-
mon in many other fields, to relevant applications in
risk analysis.
REFERENCES
1. Morgan, M. G. (2001). The neglected art of bounding analysis,
Viewpoint. Environmental Science & Technology, 35, 162A–
164A.
2. Morgan, M. G., Henrion, M., & Small, M. (1990). Uncer-
tainty: A Guide to Dealing with Uncertainty in Quantitative
Risk and Policy Analysis. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
3. Morgan, M. G., Morris, S. C., Henrion, M., Amaral, D. A. L., &
Rish, W. R. (1984). Technical uncertainty in quantitative policy
analysis: A sulfur air pollution example. Risk Analysis, 4, 201–
216.
4. Morgan, M. G., & Keith, D. (1995). Subjective judgments by
climate experts. Environmental Science & Technology, 29(10),
468–476.
5. Morgan, M. G., Pitelka, L. F., & Shevliakova, E. (2001). Elici-
tation of expert judgments of climate change impacts on forest
ecosystems. Climatic Change, 49, 279–307.
